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THERE is no topic in the conflict of la\vs so full of legal difficulties today as the migratory divorce prob· 
lem. Williams v. North Carolina I and II have not found 
a solution to this problem, but still insist for the recogni· 
tion of interstate divorce upon the acquisition of a bona 
fide domicil. 
Public opinion in America has always been greatly 
divided on the social desirability of "easy" divorces. Early 
in the 19th century there was a great deal of complaint 
in Massachusetts concerning the "easy" Vermont divorces. 
Massachusetts did not allow divorce at that time for ex-
treme cruelty, ~hereas Vermont did. Furthermore Ver· 
mont permitted divorce without any settled domicil. 
.·Judge Sewell of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa· 
chusetts, referring to the lax Vermont laws of his time, 
said: "The operation of this assumed and extraordinary 
jurisdiction is an annoyance to the neighboring states, 
injurious to the morals and habits of their people; and 
" An address given before the Legal Clinic of the Dade County Bar 
Association on December 17, 1946. 
"" Professor of Law, Univ. of Miami, Professor of Law Emeritus, Yale 
School of Law, Ph.B., Cornell University, 1898; LL.B. Cornell Univer-
sity, 1899; :!!:cole de Droit, :!!:cole Libre des Sciences Politlques, Paris; 
University of Heidelberg; J.U.D., maxima cum laude, Gottlngen, 1901; 
Hon. M.A. Yale, 1917. 
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the existence of it is, for this reason, to be reprobated 
in the strongest terms, and to be counteracted by legisla-
tive provisions in the offended states."' 
Fifty years later Chief Justice Redfield complained of 
the lax divorce legislation of Rhode Island, Maine, and 
Indiana. In an article concerning the early cases in sup-
port of the status theory of divorce, he said: "And these 
decisions have all come from states which have acquired 
an unenviable notoriety in regard to their lax views upon 
the law of divorce."' 
The two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Williams v. North Carolina· have again raised 
the legal difficulties presented by the migratory divorce. 
These decisions appear to rest upon the status theory of 
divorce and appear to hold that if the defendant has been 
brought before the court constructively, the validity of 
the divorce depends upon whether or not the plaintiff ac-
quired a bona fide domicil in the state. 
STATUS v. CONTRACT OR PENAL THEORY- NEW YORK 
The interstate divorce problem has been judicially con-
sidered far more frequently in New York than in any 
other American jurisdiction. The development of this field 
of law in New York is valuable background for lawyers 
everywhere who must consider the interstate validity of 
divorces. 
The New York courts have up to the present time de-
clined to accept the status theory of divorce in all of its 
1ogical implications.' Early in the 19th century the New 
York courts required jurisdiction over the parties and 
over the subject-matter. By subject-matter they seem 
to have meant either that the marriage was celebrated in 
New York or that the tort was committed while the parties 
were domiciled in that state. The first is known as the 
contract theory, and the latter as the penal theory re-
• Barber v. Root, 10 Mass. 260, 265 (1813 l. 
' 3 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 193, 217 (1864). 
• :n7 u.S. 287 (1942), and 325 u.s. 226 (1945). 
• For fuller discussion see Howe, Recognition of Foreign Divorce 
Decrees in New York State (1940) 40 Col. L.· Rev. 373. 
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garding divorce. In 1816, for instance, Judge Platt stated 
that a divorce granted in the state in which the marriage 
was celebrated might be entitled to recognition.' That is 
the contract theory of divorce. As late as 1871, Judge 
Parker still held to the penal theory. Suit for divorce 
was brought in New York by the husband. The 
answer was that he had established a residence in Iowa 
and obtained a divorce there on the ground of cruel and 
inhuman treatment, the wife having been served con-
structively oniy. The husband demurred to the answer 
and the demurrer was sustained. Judge Parker said: HOn 
no principle can the courts of Iowa have had jurisdiction 
of the subject-matter of the suit in this case. The act 
which was the cause of the action being no wrong to the 
plaintiff when committed, both parties being domiciled 
in this state, clearly, while the plaintiff remained. in this 
state, the courts of Iowa had no jurisdiction of it. Juris-
diction was not given to such courts of such subject-
matter by the subsequent removal of the parties to that 
state."' 
By 1878, however, a new conception of what consti-
tuted the subject-matter of divorce jurisdiction had arisen 
in New York. In that year, Judge Folger remarked: "When 
the statutes of a state have conferred upon any of its 
courts the power to act judicially upon the matrimonial 
status o:i its citizens, or of persons within its territorial 
limits, and to adjudge a dissolution of the relation of 
husband and wife; then, we take it, such court has juris-
rliction of the subject-matter of divorce .... Power given 
by law to a court, to adjudge divorces from the ties of 
matrimony, does give jurisdiction of the subject-matter 
of divorce.'" Apparently a court was deemed to have 
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of divorce if it had 
been given the power to deal with that question by the 
legislature. The problem was then only whether the de-
' Pawlln v. Bird's Executors, 13 Johns. 192 (N. Y. 1816}. 
" Holmes v. Holmes, -1 Lans. 388, 389 (N .. Y. 1871). 
' Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 228 (1878). See also Kinnier v. Kinnier, 
-15 N.Y. 535 (1871}. 
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fendant had been brought before the court in a proper 
manner. 
The status theory of divorce was advocated in other 
New York cases, due largely to the influence of the Rhode 
Island leading case of Ditson v. Ditson• favoring that 
view: The status theory, however, was never accepted 
in New York to the full extent suggested in the Ditson 
case. 
The legislative history in New York regarding local 
jurisdiction for divorce tells the same story. The New 
York courts have never had jurisdiction for divorce and 
do not possess it now solely on the ground that both 
parties are domiciled in the state at the time the suit 
is brought. The New York ·statutes confer jurisdiction 
only: 
1. Where both parties were residents of the state 
when the offense was committed. 
2. Where the parties were married within the state. 
3. Where the plaintiff was . a resident of the state 
when the offence was committed and is a resident thereof 
when the action is commenced. 
4. Where the offence was committed within the state 
and the injured party is a resident of the state when the 
action is commenced.'. 
From the beginning, the New York courts have never 
had jurisdiction solely on the basis of the status theory of 
divorce. Either the adultery must have been committed 
in New York (and the plaintiff be a resident at the time 
of suit), or the parties must be domiciled in New York 
at the time of the adultery, or the marriage must have 
been celebrated in N~w York, or the plaintiff must have 
. been a resident of New York both at the time of the 
offence and the suit. 
Prior to Williams v. North Carolina, the modern New 
York decisions presented two characteristic trends. First, 
they have continued to insist upon the necessity of per-
' 4 R.I. 87 (1856). Discussed infra. 
• See Greene, The Enforcement of a Foreign Divorce in New York 
(1926) 11 Corn. L.Q. 141. 
•• New York Civil Practice Act, Section 1147. 
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sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. In their latest 
decisions this rule is applied only to New York defendants. 
Where the defendant has his or her domicil in some other 
state, the New York courts will refer to the decisions of 
that state. If the divorce is recognized in that state with-
out personal service over the defendant, the New York 
courts will recognize it. If they do not, the New York 
courts will not do so." The other peculiarity is that ac-
cording to a number of decisions the New York courts 
will not inquire whether a bona fide domicil has been 
acquired in the state granting a divorce, provided the 
defendant appeared in the proceedings." These cases are 
.opposed, of course, to the status theory of divorce. 
THE STATUS THEORY 
In 1841, Story, the great authority on the conflict of 
Ia ws, wrote: "The doctrine now firmly established in 
America upon the subject of divorce is that the law of 
the place of the actual bona fide domicil of the parties 
gives jurisdiction to the proper courts, to decree a divorce 
for any cause allowed by the local law, without any re-
ference to the law of the place of the original marriage, 
or the place where the offence for which the divorce is 
allowed was committed."'" 
This certainly looks like the status theory as it is con-
ceived today, but apparently it was not so understood by 
courts or writers at the time and later. In editing the sixth 
edition of Story, Chief Justice Redfield stated that the 
accepted rule of jurisdiction "must receive this qualifica-
tion that it be not extended beyond transactions occurring 
while the parties had a fixed and permanent domicil 
within the forum."" Judge Parker of New York pointed 
out that Story did not mean to suggest that "the cause 
of action can be transferred from one jurisdiction to an-
" Ball v. Cross, 231 N.Y. 329 (1921); Dean v. Dean, 241 N.Y. 240 
(1925). 
" Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14 (1923); Glaser v. Glaser, 276 N.Y. 296 
(1938); Ansorge v. Armour, 267 N.Y. 492 (1935); Guggenheim v. Wahl. 
203 N.Y. 390 (1911); Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N.Y. 535 (1871); Tiedemann 
v. Tiedemann, 158 N.Y. Supp. 851 (1916). 
" Story, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1841) Section 230a . 
.. Story, Con[liat of Laws (6th ed. by Redfield, 1865) Section 230a. 
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other; but it is, as therein stated, the law of the place 
of the actual domicil of the parties which gives juris-
diction; and the jurisdiction of the subject-matter, must, 
of course, exist at the time of the commission of the of-· 
fense which constitutes the cause of action, or not at all. 
The law of the place of domicil at the time of the com-
mission of the offense, though committed in another place, 
will control.''" · 
Of all the early decisions, Ditson v. Ditson,'" decided 
in 1856, sets forth the status theory of divorce in the most 
explicit manner. A female citizen of Rhode Island had 
been married in New York to an Englishman. They 
lived for several years abroad, and she was finally deserted 
by him in Massachusetts, where they were domiciled at 
the time. The wife thereupon returned to her father's 
house in Rhode Island. After residing in Rhode Island 
for three years she brought suit for divorce there. Re-
garding the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island courts Chief 
Justice Ames said: "It is a well-settled principle of gen-
eral law upon this subject, that the tribunals of a country 
have no jurisdiction over a cause of divorce, wherever 
the offense may have occurred, if neither of the parties 
has a bona fide domicil within its territory; and this 
holds, whether one or both of the parties be temporarily 
l'esiding within reach of the process of the court, or 
whether the defendant appears or not, and submits to 
the suit. This necessarily results from the right of every 
nation or state to determine the status of its own domiciled 
citizens or subjects, without interference by foreign 
tribunals in a matter with which they have no concern."" 
" Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388, 390 (N.Y. 1871). 
•• 4 R.I. 87 (1856). 
" ld. at 93. Further at page 106, Chief Justice Ames says, "It la 
obvious, that marriage, as a domestic relation (emerged from the oon-
tract which created it) is known and recognized as such throughout the 
civilized world; that it gives rights, and imposes duties and restrictions 
upon the parties to it, affecting their social and moral condition, of the 
measure of which every civilized state, and certainly every state of this 
Union, is the sole judge so fal' as ita own citizens or subjects are con-
cerned, and should be so deemed by other civilized, and especially sister 
states that a state cannot be deprived, directly or indirectly, of its aov-
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In 1877 the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided the famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff," in which it 
laid down the fundamental distinction between actions in 
personam and actions in rem. Courts accepting the reason-
ing of Chief Justice Ames in Ditson v. Ditson thereafter 
classified divorce proceedings as actions in rem \Vhich 
\\iOuld justify the use of constructive service with respect 
to the absent defendant. 
Toward the middle of the last century, if not before, 
a married woman who was justified in living apart from 
her husband because of his fault, was permitted to acquire 
a separate domicil for purposes of divorce and to bring 
her husband before the court by constructive service.'" 
Before long it was recognized that whenever husband and 
wife had separate domicils, the marriage status, i.e. the 
res or subject-matter of the divorce action, ~as at the 
domicil of either spouse, so as to give jurisdiction to 
both states to gra·nt a valid divorce upon constructive 
service. 
ereign power to regulate the status of its own domiciled subjects and 
citizens, by the fact that the subjects and citizens, of other states, as 
related to them, are interested in that status, and in such a .matter has 
a right, under the general law, judicially to deal with and modify or 
dissolve this relation, binding both parties to it by the decree, by virtue 
of its inherent power over its own citizens and subjects, and to enable 
it to answer their obligatory demands for justice; and finally, that In the 
exercise of this judicial power ... the general law does not deprive a 
state of its proper jurisdiction over the condition of its own citizens. 
because non-residents, foreigners, or domiciled inhabitants of other 
states have not or will not become, and cannot be made to become, per-
sonally subject to the jurisdiction of its courts; but upon the most fami· 
liar principles, and as illustrated by the most familiar analogies of 
general law, its courts may and can act conclusively in such a matter· 
upon the rights and interests of such persons, giving to them such notice, 
actual or constructive, as the nature of the case admits, and the practice 
of the courts in similar cases sanctions." 
,. 95 u.s. 714 (1877). 
" Mr. Justice Swayne makes this broad statement in Cheever v. 
Wilson, 9 WalL 108, 19 L.Ed. 604, 608 (1869): "The rule is that she 
may acquire a separate domicil whenever it is necessary or proper that 
she should do so. The right springs from the necessity for its exercise, 
and endures as long as the necessity continues;" 
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Professor Minor,'" of the University of Virginia, sum-
marizing the state of the law in his text-book on the con-
flict of laws, which appeared in 1901, divides the cases 
into three classes. Most courts had accepted by that time· 
the status theory of divorce so forcefully expounded by 
Chief Justice Ames in Ditson v. Ditson, and called by 
Professor Minor the in rem theory. A few states at that 
time would recognize a foreign divorce rendered in the 
Rtate of the plaintiff'~ bona fide d0micil only if the 
defendant received actual notice of the pendency of the 
action in time to be able to defend the suit. Professor 
Minor calls this the quasi-in-rem theory. The third theory 
he calls the in personam theory, referring to the attitude 
of the New York courts. By the in personam theory 
Professor Minor did not mean what is usually meant by 
that phrase, namely, that jurisdiction over the parties is 
sufficient, but that the foreign divorce would not be 
recognized, even if the plaintiff had acquired a bona fide 
domicil in the state of the divorce, unless the defendant 
was personally before the court. We have seen above 
that the New York courts have adhered to this rule with 
respect to New York defendants. 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
Such was the general state of affairs in 1901, when 
Professor Minor wrote. In the same year, the question of 
the application of the full faith and credit clause to di-
vorce decrees rendered by courts of sister states came 
for the first time before the Supreme Court of the United 
States. In Bell v. Bell" the parties were domiciled in 
New York. The husband obtained a divorce in Pennsyl-
vania on constructive service. The law of Pennsylvania 
required that the plaintiff be a bona fide resident of the 
state. The referee having fourid that the husband had 
not acquired a bona fide domicil in Pennsylvania, the 
Supreme Court held that the decree was not entitled to 
full faith and credit. Mr. Justice Gray said: "No valid 
divorce can be decreed on constructive service by the courts 
of a state in which neither party is domiciled." 
'" Minor, Conflict of Laws ( 1901) . 
.. 181 u.s. 175 (1901) .• 
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In Streitwolf v. Streitwolf," decided by the Supreme 
Court at the same time as Bell v. Bell, the parties were 
domiciled in New Jersey. The husband obtained a divorce 
in North Dakota, the law of which required a domicil in 
good faith for ninety clays as a prerequisite for juris-
diction for divorce. The husband not having obtained a 
bona fide domicil, the Supreme Court held on the basis of 
Bell v. Bell that New Jersey need not recognize the North 
Dakota decree. Atherton v. Atherton," rlecided in the 
same year, held that where the divorce was obtained at 
the matrimonial domicil upon constructive service, it must 
be recognized elsewhere. 
In Andrews v. Andrews," which came before the 
Supreme Court in 1903, the parties had their domicil 
in Massachusetts. The husband went to South Dakota 
for the purpose of getting a divorce and the wife con-
sented to the granting of the decree. The courts of Massa-
chusetts declined to recognize the decree and the Supreme 
Court held that they were justified in their attitude, in 
view of the fact that neither party was domiciled in South 
Dakota. 
In 1906 the Supreme Court decided the famous case 
of Haddock v. Haddock." The parties were domiciled in 
New York. The husband abandoned his wife and estab-
lished a bona fide domicil in Connecticut, where he ob-
tained a divorce on constructive service. The New York 
courts declined to recognize the divorce because the New 
York defendant was not personally before the Connecti-
cut court. The Supreme Court held that the New York 
courts were under no constitutional duty to recognize 
the divorce with respect to the New York defendant," 
" 181 U.S. 177 (1901) . 
.. 181 u.s. 155 (1901) . 
.. 188 u.s. 14 (1903) . 
•• 201 u.s. 525 (1906). 
•• This decision met with a great deal of disapproval. See Beale, 
Constitutional Protection ot Decrees ior Divorce ( 1906). 19 Harv. L. Rev. 
586. In 1926 Professor Beale wrote another article on the subject, 
Haddock Revisited, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417. This article was written in 
support of Professor Beale's new theory on interstate recognition of 
divorce which was accepted by the American Law Institute. This theory 
was in corpora ted in Section 113: "A state can exercise through its courts 
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although it was admitted that Connecticut had jurisdic-
tion over the status of the husband so as to be able to 
grant him a valid divorce, at least a divorce valid in 
Connecticut. 
No other case came before the Supreme Court until 
1938, when in Davis v. Davis" the Supreme Court held 
that the parties litigating the issue of domicil were pre-
cluded on grounds of res judicata from raising the ques-
tion again in another suit." 
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage of spouses of whom one is domiciled 
within the state and the other is domiciled outside the state if 
a. the spouse who is not domiciled in the state 
(i) has consented that the other spouse acquire a separate home; or 
(ii) by his or her misconduct has ceased to have the right to object 
to the acquisition of such separate home; ... " Restatement of 
The Law of Conflict of Laws (1934) Section 113. 
Under this new theory "fault" becomes a jurisdictional fact in connec· 
tion with the recognition of foreign divorce, and much objection has been 
raised against the theory. See Bingham, The American Law lnstitttte v. 
The Supreme Court- in the Matter of Haddock v. HacMock (1936) 21 
Corn. L.Q. 393; McClintock, Fault as an Element of Divorce Jurisdiction 
(1928) 37 Yale L.J. 564. As the Haddock case was overruled in Williams 
v. North Carolina I, the theory underlining the Restatement has ceased 
to be of practical importance. 
" 305 U.S. 32 f1938). 
'" This was one of the earlier cases in 'which the Supreme Court 
extended the bounds of res adjudicata to the subject·matter of a suit. 
See also Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). In an 
earlier decision it had applied res adjudicata to jurisdiction over the 
person. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Association, 283 
U.S. 522 (1931). See also Re8tatement of the Law of Judgments, Ameri-
can Law Institute (1942) Section 10, which reads: 
" ( 1) Where a court has jurisdiction over the parties and determines 
that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties cannot 
collaterally attack the judgment on the ground that the court did not 
have jurisdiction over the subject matter, unless the policy underlying 
the doctrine of res judicata is outweighed by the policy against permit-
ting a cou:r:t to act beyond its jurisdiction. (2) Among the factors 
appropriate to be considered in determining that collateral attack should 
be permitted are that 
(a) the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter was clear; 
(h) the determination as to jurisdiction depended upon a questton of 
law rather than of fact; 
{c) the court was one of limited and not of general jurisdiction; 
(d) the question of jurisdiction was not actually litigated; 
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THE WILLIAMS CASES 
In 1942 the case of Williams v. North Carolina r· 
raised once more the status of migratory divorce decrees 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.*" In that case 
both Williams and Mrs. Hendrix had been married and 
domiciled for many years in North Carolina. They went 
to Nevada for purposes of divorce, which they obtained 
after six weeks residence. They thereupon married in 
Nevada and returned immediately to North Carolina, 
where they were indicted for bigamous cohabitation. Re-
lying on the decision of the Haddock case, the state did 
not challenge the acquisition of a bona fide domicil by 
the defendants in Nevada, but tried the case on the theory 
that North Carolina did not have to recognize the Nevada 
decree because the defendants in the Nevada proceedings 
had been served only constructively. In the Haddock case 
it had been decided, as we have seen, that New York did 
not have to recognize the Connecticut decree with respect 
to the New York spouse, because of the lack of personal 
jurisdiction, although it was conceded that. the husband 
had acquired a bona fide domicil in Connecticut. The 
parties were convicted, and upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States this conviction was reversed, 
the Haddock case being expressly overruled. 
The State of North Carolina did not rest at that point, 
but tried the parties again, this time challenging the ac-
quisition of a bona fide domicil in Nevada. It having 
been found that such a domicil had not been acquired, 
the parties were again convicted. Once more the cases 
were carried to the Supreme Court, which sustained the 
convictions, holding that the courts of North Carolina 
could inquire into the bona fide character of the Nevada 
(e) the policy against the court's acting beyond its jurisdiction is 
strong." 
,. 317 u.s. 287 (1942). 
•• See Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overruled (1943), 52 Yale L.J. 
341; Strahorn and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled- The Future 
of Inter8tate Divorce (1942}, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29; Barnhard, Haddock 
Reversed- Harbinger of the Divisible Divorce (1943), 31 Geo. L.J. 210; 
Taintor, Is Haddock Dead? (1943), 15 Miss. L.J. 165. 
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domicil and could decline to recognize the divorces in 
case no such domicil had been established." 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority 
of the court said: "Under our system of law, judicial 
power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-
is founded on domicil. ... The framers of the Constitu-
tion were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, 
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in 
the English-speaking world has questioned it. Domicil 
implies a nexus between person and place of such per-
manence as to control the creation of legal relations and 
responsibilities of the utmost significance. The domicil 
of one spouse within a State gives power to that State, 
we have held, to dissolve a marriage wheresoever con-
tracted. . . . Divorce, like marriage, is of concern not 
merely to the immediate parties. It affects personal rights 
of the deepest significance. It also touches basic interests 
of society. Since divorce, like marriage, creates a new 
status, every consideration of policy makes it desirable· 
that the effect should be the same wherever the question 
arises.""' 
Mr. Justice Rutledge wrote a dissenting opinion and 
so did Mr. Justice Black, in whose opinion Mr. Justice 
Douglas joined. 
Mr. Justice Rutledge contended that the test of 
domicil was not contained in the Constitution of the 
United States but constituted a judicial importation which 
"has outlived its jurisdictional usefulness unless caprice, 
confusion and contradiction are desirable criteria of juris-
dictional conceptions." Since, in the estimation of Mr. 
Justice Rutledge, according to the majority of the court 
the divorce decrees were valid in Nevada, he contends that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause demanded that they be 
recognized as valid everywhere. If full faith and credit 
were not to be given to the Nevada decrees, argues Mr . 
., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See Lorenzen, 
Extraterritorial Divorce~ Williams v. North Carolina II (1945), 54 Yale 
L.J. 799; and Powell, And Repent at Lei8ure (1945), 58 Harv. L. 
Rev. 930. 
" Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945). 
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Justice Rutledge, the constitutional policy should at least 
be approximated by not allowing other states to deny them 
full faith and credit "by any standard of proof which is 
less than generally required to overturn or disregard a 
judgment upon direct attack.""• 
Mr. Justice Black assumed that in the opinion of the 
majority, the Nevada decrees, without bona fide domicil 
in the state, were invalid in Nevada, and he objected to 
the introduction of the test of domicil as a prerequisite 
to the validity of divorce under the Due Process Clause 
its an umvarrantecl expansion of federal power. 
In the case of Esenwein v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania;· decided at the same time as Williams v. North 
Carolina II, the-dissenting justices in the latter case agreed 
with the majority on the ground that a distinction existed 
between the cases in which the marital capacity of the 
divorced persons was challenged, which might lead to 
criminal convictions and the bastardization of children, 
and cases of marital support, which do not necessarily 
raise irreconcilable conflicts between the policies of two 
states. In the Esenwein case, the wife had obtained an 
order for support in Pennsylvania. The husband later 
obtained a divorce in Nevada and thereupon filed a peti-
tion in Pennsylvania for total relief from the support 
order. The application was denied on the ground that 
he had not acquired a bona fide domicil in Nevada. The 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court unanimously. 
As long as the Supreme Court adheres to the views 
expressed in the two cases of Williams v. North Carolina," 
it would seem that whenever Nevada divorces are ob-
tained upon constructive service the other states are not 
bound by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize 
those decrees if neither spouse had a bona fide domicil 
in Nevada, and that any finding of domicil by the di-
vorce court may be challenged by evidence showing that 
the plaintiff in the divorce suit had no intention to es-
tablish a bona fide domicil in the state, in the sense of 
•• Id. at 244 . 
.. 325 u.s. 279 (1946). 
" 317 U.S. 287 (1942) and 325 U.S. 226 (1945). 
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intending to make it his or her permanent home, or at 
least, his or her home for an indefinite period of time:· 
It will be observed that the Supreme Court in the two 
Williams cases adopts the status theory of divorce set 
forth in Ditson v. Ditson ninety years ago." 
If this position leads ·to most undesirable results, 
namely, the invalidation of many divorces and the possible 
bastardization of children, it may be asked what alterna~ 
tives were open to the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Rut~ 
ledge suggests that the Supreme Court should abandon 
the requirement of ·domicil altogether, or at least allow 
it to be challenged only by a standard of proof required 
for a direct attack. If the latter course were adopted it 
would be very difficult indeed to challenge the Nevada 
•• This test of domicil is the one universally adopted in this country. 
See Dupuy v. Wurtz, 55 N.Y. 556 (1873). It might be called "domicil" in 
the international sense as contrasted with domicil in the local sense. In 
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), the Supreme Court drew a 
similar distinction between a "penal" law in the conflict of laws sense 
(for purposes of the enforcement of judgments Of sister states and for-
eign countries) and "penal" law for local purposes. It was there stated 
that "the question whether a statute of one state which in some aspects 
may be called penal, is a penal law, in the international sense, so that 
it cannot be enforced in the courts of another state, depends upon the 
question whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the public 
justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by 
the wrongful act. . .. " 
For local purposes "domicil" may be defined by a state as requiring 
!lomething less than for conflict of laws purposes. In connection with 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Supreme Court naturally and 
· correctly applied the traditional conflict of laws concept of domicil. 
•• Where the defendant appears and challenges the acquisition of the 
domicil by the plaintiff, he will be precluded from questioning it again 
in a subsequent proceeding. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). In New 
York and elsewhere, persons who have invoked the jurisdiction of the 
divorce court, cannot later set up the defense that the court had no 
jurisdiction. See Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, Section 
112 (estoppel to deny jurisdiction); Jacobs, Attack upon Divorce Decrees 
(1936), M Mich. L. Rev. 749, 959; Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce 
{1935), 2 Law & Contemp. Prob. 335; Harper, The Validity of Void 
Divorces {1930), 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 158; Derby, Obligation of Invalid 
Divorce on Person Who Induced It and Married Party Procuring It 
(1934), 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 31; 9 Geo. L.J. 106 (1940); 54 Harv. L. Rev. 
1060 (1941). Compare Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). 
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divorce, and for all practical purposes it would validate 
the migratory divorce. And what is the objection to such 
a change of attitude _by the Supreme Court? The ob-
jection is that it fails to consider the rights of defendants 
and of the state in which they are domiciled. 
Take the Williams cases. Here the parties had their 
domicils for many years in North Carolina. Williams and 
Mrs. Hendrix go to Nevada and remain there only six 
weeks. Mrs. Williams No. 1 and Hendrix continue to 
reside in North Carolina. The question presented is one 
of balancing the rights of Nevada against those of North 
Carolina and the rights of the respective spouses. North 
Carolina has a deep interest in its citizens and their status 
and Nevada has a like interest in its citizens and their 
status. After all, the character of a state is determined 
by the people domiciled therein and not by those who are 
merely temporary residents. The Supreme Court under 
the Constitution is the final arbiter of these conflicting 
claims. If it holds that Nevada has the power to divorce 
the parties in the Williams cases, it means that Nevada 
has not only the· power to undermine the divorce legisla-
tion of North Carolina, but that it has the power also 
to compel the other spouses that remained in North Caro-
lina to litigate their marital relations in Nevada when 
they are unwilling to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
courts and the divorce policies of that state. Is it fair 
, to hold that they may be brought before the courts of 
Nevada by constructive service when they are unwilling 
to submit to the lax divorce laws of Nevada? If this 
were an action on a contract, this could not be done with-
out violating the Due Process Clause. Why should it be 
allowed in a suit for divorce where the plaintiffs have 
been in the state only six weeks and intend to return to 
North Carolina immediately? If constructive service were 
allowed under such circumstances could it not be con-
tended tha,t it would be valid likewise if Nevada reduced 
the residence requirement to a single week or a single 
day? It is extremely difficult, therefore, to accept the 
suggestion of Mr. Justice Rutledge. 
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Let us see now where Mr. Justice Black's suggestion 
leads to. He puts forth the argument that under the Act 
of Congress the judgments and decrees of sister states 
are entitled to the same faith and credit as they have by 
law or usage in the state where they have been rendered, 
and that a divorce which is valid in Nevada is therefore 
valid everywhere. The question thus becomes whether the 
Nevada divorces are valid in Nevada. Mr. Justice Jackson 
in his dissenting opinion in Williams v. North Carolina I 
admits that the Nevada divorces without bona fide domicil 
may be valid in Nevada for some limited purposes, but 
not beyond. He says: "To hold that the Nevada judg-
. ments were not binding in North Carolina because they 
were rendered without jurisdiction over the North_ Caro-
lina spouses, it is not necessary to hold that they were 
without any conceivable validity. It may be, and probably 
is, true that Nevada has sufficient interest in the lives 
of those who sojourn there to free them and their spouses 
to take new spouses without incurring criminal penalties 
under Nevada law. I know of nothing in our Constitution 
that requires Nevada to adhere to the traditional con-
cepts of bigamous unions or the legitimacy of the fruit 
thereof. And the control of a state over property within 
its borders is so complete that I suppose that Nevada 
could effectively deal with it in the name of divorce as 
completely as in any other. But it is quite a different 
thing to say that Nevada can dissolve the marriages of 
North Carolinians and dictate the incidence of the bigamy 
·statutes of North Carolina by which North Carolina has 
sought to protect her own interests as well as theirs. In 
this case there is no conceivable basis of jurisdiction in 
the Nevada court over the absent spouses, and, a fortiori, 
over North Carolina herself."" The ultimate question is 
whether Nevada shall be regarded as having the con-
stitutional power to divorce anybody actually within the 
state, even upon constructive service, without any re-
quirement of domicil or residence? If the answer is in 
the affirmative, why require any physical presence? Why 
could not the divorce legislation be carried as far as in 
.. 317 u.s. 287, 319 (1942). 
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some parts of Mexico, \Vhere jurisdiction will be taken 
upon the basis of mere consent? We would then be in a 
position to recognize divorce by mail. 
It is apparent from the above that it is extremely dif-
ficult to recognize the migratory divorce in the absence 
of a substantial period of residence. It must be admitted 
that under modern conditions the test of domicil is 
frequently most unsatisfactory," but in Anglo-American 
law many rights are determined on that basis. We have 
been unable to find a better criterion. In the conflict of 
laws domicil governs many rights in the law of family-
for example, legitimacy, legitimation and adoption. Can 
'Ye dispense with it in the law of divorce? The migratory 
divorce problem cannot be solved on the theory that the 
proceeding is one in personam;• for that theory would not 
take care of divorces where the defendant does not ap-
pear. The defendant could not be served constructively 
without violating the Due Process Clause. Residence 
might be substituted for domicil, but the question would 
be how long should that residence be in order to make it 
seem fair to have the defendant brought in constructively. 
I suggested in an article that six months might be 
enough; .. other students of the conflict of laws feel that 
one year should be a minimum. 
. If the defendant appears, the Supreme Court might 
follow the New York law and recognize the foreign di-
vorce without regard to the existence of a bona fide 
domicil. It would be difficult to reconcile this with any 
consistent theory concerning the nature of a divorce pro-
ceeding and it would not solve the migratory divorce 
problem where the defendant does not agree to the di-
vorce, and therefore declines to appear. 
•• As the establishment of domicil depends upon a person's intention 
to make it his home for an indefinite period of time, it Is often difficult 
to know where a person is actually domiciled. See In re Dorrance's 
Estate, 170 AU. 601 (1934). 
•• In support of the in pe.rsonam theory, see Ashley, Conflict of Laws 
Upcm the Subject of Marriage and Divorce (1906), 15 Yale L.J. 387. 
•• Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock Overr~tled ( 1943), 52 Yale L.J. 
341, 352. 
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What is the solution of this divorce problem? A 
sensible way out would be an Act of Congress indicating 
the terms under which divorce decrees of sister states 
shall be recognized. If it said that a residence of six 
weeks is sufficient our troubles with the Nevada divorces 
would be over. Unfortunately for the migratory divorce, 
Congress is not likely to pass such legislation. An amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States conferring 
jurisdiction upon the federal government in matters of 
divorce is still more unlikely. 
CONCLUSION 
The migratory divorce problem arose early in our law 
when some states took a more liberal view regarding di-. 
vorce than others. People naturally tried to take ad-
vantage of the more liberal laws, and at once the problem 
arose as to the validity of these migratory divorces. By 
the middle of the last century the views on the subject 
had not yet crystalized. The earlier point of view appeared 
to be that only the courts of the domicil of the parties 
at the time the offence was committed had jurisdiction, 
for the reason that the parties were citizens of that state, 
which on that account controlled their marriage relation-
ship. It was insisted also that there must be jurisdiction 
over the parties. To what extent constructive service was 
permissible does not clearly appear. Special stress upon 
the necessity of personal jurisdiction over the defendant· 
was laid in New York. 
When our courts began to recognize that for pur-
poses of divorce a married woman could acquire a separate 
domicil, the courts were presented with an even more 
difficult problem. Ditson v. Ditson '"resolved the difficulty 
by boldly proclaiming the status theory of divorce, ac-
cording to which each state in which a spouse is domiciled 
has jurisdiction over the entire subject-matter, so as to 
be able to divorce its citizens or persons domiciled therein 
upon grounds of its own choosing, and if the other party 
does not appear, he or she can be brought in by con-
gtructive service. When Pennoyer v. Neff .. was decided 
" 4 R.I. 87 (1856) . 
•• 95 u.s. 714 {1877). 
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in 1877-the case that laid down the fundamentals of 
jurisdiction in our modern law, drawing a distinction be-
tween actions in personam and actions in rem, the latter 
permitting the defendant to be brought before the court 
by constructive service-the question naturally arose of 
the classification of divorce suits. The majority of courts 
accepted the reasoning of Chief Justice Ames in Ditson 
v. Ditson," holding that .the res, the status, was in the 
state of the domicil of either party,-hence that either 
state had the power to terminate the marriage relation-
ship through divorce, and that the defendant, if need be, 
could be brought before the court on constructive service ... 
This was the situation when the first cases came be-
fore the Supreme Court in 1901. The question before 
the Court was under what circumstances a divorce decree 
of a sister state must be recognized by the other states. 
The Supreme Court might have taken the view, expressed 
by Mr. Justice Black in Williams v. North Carolina II, that 
the Constitution and the supporting Act of Congress have 
left this matter to the states and that a divorce is valid 
whenever it complies with the legislation of the state 
where it was rendered. The Supreme Court felt, however, 
that the power of the respective states regarding the status 
of their own citizens was involved and that it was its 
duty under the Constitution to be the arbiter. As marriage 
is the bulwark of society and its dissolution is of great 
concern to the state, what if the states involved have 
fundamentally different policies regarding dissolution of 
marriage! Should the states having the more conserva-
tive attitude be wi~hout power to enforce their policies 
.. 4 R.I. 87 (1856). 
" For a critical examination of Pennoyer v. Neff, see Carey, A Sug· 
yested Fundamental Ba.sis of Ju1·isdiction with Special EmphMis on 
Judicial Proceedings Affecting Decedents' Estates (1929), 24 Ill. L. Rev. 
44, 170. To the effect that considering a divorce proceeding as a pro· 
ceeding _in rem does not help the solution of the problem, see Williams 
v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287, 317, whet·e Mr. Justice Jackson says, 
"I doubt that it promotes clarity of thinking to deal with marriage in the 
terms of a res, like a piece of land or a chattel. It might be more helpful 
to think of marriage as just a marriage-a relationship out of which 
spring duties to both spouse and society and from which are derived 
rights ... " 
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with respect to their own citizens? Should they be ob~ 
liged to recognize even ex parte divorces with respect to 
their own citizens where the plaintiff spouse has gone to 
another state for purposes of divorce only and returns 
immediately afterwards to his former state, having been 
absent perhaps only six weeks or so? 
The Supreme Court felt that the state having the 
laxest laws should not be allowed to impose its views upon 
all sister states and that it should have the power to di-
vorce non-residents only when the plaintiff had become 
a local citizen by having established a bona fide domicil 
within the state. In the Haddock case the question arose 
whether even then such divorce need be recognized with 
respect to the other spouse that was not personally before 
the divorce court. Its answer in that case was that it need 
not be recognized. This doctrine was overruled in the first 
Williams case, so that today the recognition of the foreign 
divorce depends solely-we are assuming that there was 
no personal jurisdiction over the defendant-upon whether 
or not the plaintiff had established a bona fide domicil 
within the state of divorce. In other words, the view of 
the Supreme Court today is, as it has been from the be-
ginning, that the ultimate question involves the rights of 
states over their citizens and their status, and not merely 
the rights of individuals, and for that reason it is unable 
to let go of domicil as the determining factor. 
In the nature of things the Supreme Court has in-
sisted that the test of domicil means domicil in the 
international or conflict of laws sense ann not in the local 
sense. If it allowed the question to be determined hy the 
states in accordance with their own solutions, the state 
having the laxest divorce laws would be able to undermine 
the policies regarding divorce of all other states. In ad~ 
justing the conflicting policies of the individual states, 
the Supreme Court has been unwilling to give the pre~ 
dominating power to the state that will go farthest in its 
divorce legislation. 
As long as we are convinced that the well-being of a 
state rests upon the family, we must also admit that the 
state should be able to control the status of its citizens 
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or domiciliaries, for it is upon the marriage status of its 
citizens that the welfare of society rests. When our courts 
recognized that a married woman could have a separate 
domicil, it became necessary to admit that each state had 
jurisdiction over the entire status, so that the state of 
divorce, provided the plaintiff had obtained a bona fide 
domicil in such state, could change also the status of the 
other spouse. Any other conclusion, namely, that where 
the parties have different domicils each state can di-
vorce only the party domiciled in the state but not the 
other, whose status is controlled by the law of his or her 
domicil, would lead to such absurdities as to be inad-
missible. For that reason, and to that extent, the policy 
of the state of the defendant must yield to the policy of 
the divorcing state. · 
The -above are the fundamental considerations, and 
as long as they are kept in view it is difficult to dispense 
with domicil as the jurisdictional test. 
In order to recognize migratory divorces, we must 
abandon all idea that a state has a special interest in 
the marital relationship of its citizens or persons domiciled 
in the state. If this can be done, there is no difficulty in 
holding that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause we 
simply have to look to the law of the state of divorce. 
Even then the Due Process Clause stares us in the face. 
How far can the state of divorce go if the defendant does 
not appear? Shall Nevada be allowed to cite the defend-
ant, .\vho is domiciled and living in North Carolina, before 
its courts by constructive service, if the plaintiff has lived 
in Nevada only six weeks, or a single week, or a single 
day, or who has not been in th~ state at all?'" These are 
grave questions and they are still unanswered. 
•• It would seem clear that a negative answer must be given to all of 
these questions. 
